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Abstract
Background: Marie Stopes Tanzania works with a voluntary cadre of 66 community-based mobilizers (CBMs), who
are tasked with raising awareness, generating demand and providing referral to potential clients for family planning,
comprehensive post-abortion care and cervical cancer screening. CBMs extend the reach of urban clinics to peri-
urban communities, enhancing access to sexual and reproductive health services. In an effort to optimize
performance of CBMs, a study was conducted to explore the drivers of CBM motivation and inform the design of
an incentive scheme.
Methods: Three focus group discussions with 17 CBMs and 11 interviews with CBM supervisors and managers
were conducted in three clinics and the head office. After thematic analysis of transcripts, findings on motivational
factors were discussed in a reflection workshop and informed the development of a discrete choice experiment
(DCE) involving 61 CBMs as respondents. The DCE included eight choice questions on two incentive schemes, each
consisting of five attributes related to remuneration, training, supervision, benefits and identification. For each
attribute, different incentive options were presented, based on the outcomes of the qualitative assessment. The
DCE results were analysed using conditional logistic regression.
Results: A variety of factors motivated CBMs. Most CBMs were motivated to conduct their work because of an
intrinsic desire to serve their community. The most mentioned extrinsic motivational factors were recognition from
the community and supervisors, monthly allowance, availability of supporting materials and identification, trainings,
supervision and feedback on performance. Recommendations for improvement were translated into the DCE.
Incentive attributes that were found to be significant in DCE analysis (p < 0.05), in preference order, were carrying
an ID card, bi-monthly training, supervision conducted via both monthly meetings at clinics and visits from the
head office, and a monthly flat rate remuneration (over pay for performance).
Conclusion: Despite the recognition that being a CBM is voluntary, incentives, especially those of non-financial
nature, are important motivators. Incentive schemes should include basic compensation with a mix of other
incentives to facilitate CBMs’ work and enhance their motivation. Programme designs need to take into account
the voices of community-based workers, to optimize their performance and service delivery to communities they
serve.
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Background
Community health workers (CHWs) form an instrumen-
tal part of health systems in low- and middle-income
countries. They mostly focus on health promotion and
disease prevention and form the connection between
communities and the health sector, partly through refer-
ral. There are many different types and names of CHWs,
and their position in health systems varies, from fully in-
tegrated and salaried workers with multiple tasks to vol-
untary workers, who are often attached to specific health
programmes [1, 2].
While many governments are in the process of estab-
lishing a formalized cadre of CHWs, in many countries,
a multitude of different types of CHWs are present, who
are often deployed by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). This is also the case in Tanzania, where the
government is in the process of implementing the Na-
tional Community Based Health Care Strategic Plan
2014–2020, which includes revival and integration of
paid CHWs, trained for 1 year, into the health workforce
[3]. However, this process is on hold, and at the mo-
ment, voluntary CHWs of different types still dominate
the community health landscape.
One of the voluntary CHW cadres in Tanzania are
community-based mobilizers (CBMs), deployed by Marie
Stopes Tanzania (MST). This cadre, different from many
others, works in urban and peri-urban areas where they
are tasked with raising awareness, generating demand
and providing referral to potential clients for MST ser-
vices, such as family planning, comprehensive post-
abortion care and cervical cancer screening. CBM selec-
tion criteria include being 18 years or above, completion
of primary school or a higher education level, and being
known by and having understanding of their community.
Sixty-six CBMs serve catchment areas of 11 clinics,
which cover the four regions of Tanzania (a group of six
CBMs per clinic). Like in other countries of operation,
CBMs serve at a voluntary basis, though they receive a
small stipend (40 000 Tsh/17.50 USD per month). Their
average time investment per week varies: the majority
reports spending 1 to 4 days per month on their work,
the rest reports spending 5 days or more.
In recent years, governments, programmers and re-
searchers have shown interest in optimizing motivation
and performance of CHWs. The design of CHW pro-
grammes, whether integrated in the health system or re-
lated to specific NGO programmes, can influence
CHWs’ motivation, which is an instrumental component
of performance [4]. Evidence has shown that CHW per-
formance can be sub-optimal, because of inadequate
training and supervision, insufficient incentives and lack
of supplies and logistical support [2]. An earlier study on
incentives and disincentives for CHWs pointed towards
the problem of high attrition rates of voluntary CHW
programmes, leading to high costs and lack of continuity
in relationships between CHWs and communities. The
study concluded that a complex set of factors influence
CHW motivation and attrition and that these factors dif-
fer per context [5].
Motivation can be defined as “an individual’s degree of
willingness to exert and maintain an effort towards
organizational goals” [6]. It can be seen as a transac-
tional process between an individual and the work envir-
onment, influenced by the broader context. Factors that
influence motivation can be categorized as extrinsic and
intrinsic [6]. Extrinsic motivational factors can be further
categorized into financial, non-financial and in-kind [7].
While financial incentives, such as stipends, allowances
and performance-based financial rewards are found to
be important for motivation of voluntary and paid
CHWs, non-financial incentives are often found to be as
important [8–10]. A study on voluntary CHWs in
Tanzania found that CHWs were driven by intrinsic mo-
tivation: the love for the work, the commitment towards
the public service and the community, and the desire to
help themselves and their families. Furthermore, non-
financial incentives, in the form of moral family support,
respect and recognition from the community and sup-
port from the organization or programme (such as train-
ing, supervision and material support) influenced CHW
motivation [10].
Some scholars have debated that voluntary CHWs
have higher intrinsic motivation and commitment to-
wards their communities than officially paid CHWs [11,
12]. Payment of salaries could lead to demotivation of
CHWs when expectations are not met, cause tension
when different cadres of CHWs compare their salaries
[5] and weaken internalized extrinsic motivation or even
intrinsic motivation [13].
To date, many CHW programmes, including the CBM
programmes of Marie Stopes International, still face
challenges with poor motivation and retention. Existing
evidence on which incentive packages improve CHWs’
motivation and performance in various contexts is still
limited [14]. Therefore, a study was conducted to ex-
plore the drivers of CBM motivation in Tanzania and in-
form the design of an (adjusted) incentive scheme that
could result in improved CBM performance. The study
aimed to contribute to strengthening MST’s CBM oper-
ations, but could also provide insights for the revived
CHW programme in Tanzania and other countries.
Methods
We conducted a mixed-methods study in November–
December 2017. The first phase included focus group
discussions (FGDs) with CBMs, key informant interviews
(KIIs) with CBM supervisors and managers and a
Kok et al. Human Resources for Health          (2019) 17:101 Page 2 of 9
reflection workshop with MST staff. This fed into a sec-
ond phase, comprising a discrete choice experiment
(DCE).
The first phase was conducted in three MST clinics:
Mabibo (Dar es Salaam region), Kahama (Shinyanga re-
gion) and Mbeya (Mbeya region), of which the first pre-
sents an urban setting and the latter two present peri-
urban settings. Besides the geographical location and
setting, the selection of the three clinics was based on a
combination of how the CBMs were performing in rela-
tion to how the clinic was performing, based on the
number of clients (referred). This combination involved:
a clinic that was considered underperforming and its
CBMs were underperforming; a clinic that was consid-
ered well-performing and its CBMs were well-
performing; and a clinic that was considered underper-
forming and its CBMs were well-performing.
The FGDs, in which 17 CBMs participated, explored
how CBMs experienced their tasks, which factors moti-
vated them in their work, what they valued in the
current incentive scheme and what they would prefer as
possible new incentives. We used a broad definition of
incentives: positive or negative, intrinsic or extrinsic fac-
tors influencing CHW motivation and volunteerism [5].
Additionally, KIIs were conducted with staff who were
directly involved with the CBMs. This included four staff
from the head office, two clinic managers and three
CBM supervisors who also work at the clinic level. Two
KIIs were carried out with representatives of the District
Health Office who were knowledgeable about CBMs and
other CHWs in the district. Topic guides were pre-
tested in a clinic not included in the study, after which
small adjustments were made, which mainly concen-
trated on the expression of terms such as “motivation”
and “incentives” in Swahili. Data were collected by a
team of two researchers experienced in qualitative re-
search methods.
FGDs and KIIs were digitally recorded, transcribed
and, when applicable, translated. A combination of a de-
ductive approach, using pre-existing themes based on
literature [6, 7] and topic guides, and an inductive ap-
proach, which allowed new themes to emerge from the
data [15], was used to develop a coding framework.
Transcripts were coded and data further analysed,
“charted” in themes and subthemes and summarized in
narratives for each theme and subtheme.
Preliminary results gave rise to questions about motiv-
ation and performance of CBMs that were discussed in a
reflection workshop with MST and Marie Stopes Inter-
national staff. During this workshop, existing and pre-
ferred new incentives that came out of the qualitative
component were also discussed. Based on expected effect
on motivation and budget availability, various feasible pro-
grammatic incentive scheme options were identified,
which were quantified using a discrete choice experiment
(DCE) conducted during the second phase of the project.
A DCE comprises a quantitative analytic technique
used for eliciting stated preferences from a predefined
set of alternatives. Using an experimental design, respon-
dents are presented with pairs of hypothetical scenarios
described in terms of combinations of attributes that can
take different levels [16]. In this study, we used a DCE to
elicit the incentive preferences of CBMs. The attributes
were based on the major factors influencing extrinsic
motivation of CBMs as emerged from phase 1. We in-
cluded five attributes, each having two levels (Table 2)
which were used to develop a questionnaire with eight
assignments in which CBMs were to choose between
two sets of possible incentives (Additional file 1). The
five attributes with two levels each resulted in a total of
32 choice profiles and 512 different choice scenarios. A
factorial orthogonal design was used to test for the main
effects of different attributes on CBM preferences [17],
resulting in a simple choice set of eight questions. The
minimum sample size for the DCE to test for the main
attribute effects was 50 [18, 19]. The goodness of the fit
of the model was assessed by means of the likelihood ra-
tio of the model including the choice attributes over the
unrestricted model using and intercept only.
The DCE was pre-tested to assess the selection of attri-
butes and their levels, respondents’ understanding of the
questionnaire’s content and process and feasibility of self-
administration in this context [20, 21]. The pre-test did not
lead to changes in the questionnaire, but led to slight adjust-
ments in the instructions given to the CBMs prior to filling
in the questionnaire. The final choice set of eight questions
were administered to 61 CBMs, this included the CBMs
who participated in the pre-test. Five of the 66 CBMs work-
ing for MST were not available during data collection. Ques-
tionnaires were administered to CBMs sitting together in a
room, but with each CBM completing the questionnaire in-
dividually on paper (i.e. self-administration), after having re-
ceived instructions from the researchers (in four clinics) or
MST head office staff (in seven clinics).
DCE data from the completed questionnaires were
first double entered into Excel and inconsistencies be-
tween sequential edits were corrected before data ana-
lysis. Data analysis was conducted using R 3.3.2.
language for statistical analysis [22]. Respondents se-
lected their preferred scenario between the two sets of
possible incentives, and response data were analysed
with conditional logistic regression models to estimate
the influence of each attribute on their choice, where
p < 0.05 was considered as significant.
Results
CBMs, their managers and supervisors reported a variety
of motivational factors (Table 1: whether these factors
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were present, as perceived by most CBMs, is indicated
by + (present), +/− (partly present and partly not
present) and − (not present) respectively). The qualita-
tive findings did not reveal any differences in percep-
tions between participants of the three selected clinics.
Intrinsic motivational factors
Intrinsic motivational factors were linked to reasons for
becoming a CBM. When asked why they agreed to be-
come CBM, statements like “passion about sharing in-
formation with the community on important issues like
cervical cancer screening and family planning” and
“wanting to share with others about the friendly quality
services in a clean environment” were common among
CBMs.
Financial incentives
CBMs were given a monthly allowance of 40 000 TSh
(17.50 USD). It was transferred to CBMs on the condi-
tion that country-wide, all CBM monthly reports were
submitted to the head office. All CBMs reported that
they did not know whether there was a financial reim-
bursement or incentive before becoming CBMs: they
only came to learn about the allowance after their re-
cruitment. Similarly, many stated that they did not know
what voluntarism entailed until they started: “We didn’t
know but when we started, that is when we were told it
is voluntary… I just agreed, but I didn’t know what
volunteering is.”
The majority stated that what they get is just posho
[allowance]—as opposed to a monthly salary. The topic
of posho was raised in all FGDs, some saw it as reim-
bursement for personal costs, others for transport, or
both. All CBMs mentioned that receiving posho moti-
vated them, and they wished the posho to be raised: “I
feel good about myself with what I have achieved with
my work for MST, until I arrive home at the end of the
day and realise I don’t even have sugar for my children.
Then I wish, I could get a little bit of a compensation at
least when I am doing well.” It was also emphasized that
the posho should come in time: the condition of all
CBM monthly reports having to be in before payment
caused delays.
A few FGD participants reported that CBMs were be-
lieved to earn a lot of money and that the community
did not believe that the CBM work is voluntary. This
could potentially hinder CBM motivation and perform-
ance, because of mistrust from the side of the
community.
Non-financial incentives
In terms of non-financial motivational factors, motiv-
ation was first reported to come from within the
organization. For instance, CBMs looked at appreciation
from the clinic staff as a motivational factor. One CBM
said: “We get Makofi [claps] when we do well” and an-
other said “We feel welcomed at the clinic, sometimes
even given chai and chapatti and we walk around freely”.
Feeling accepted as part of the clinic and being sur-
rounded by friendly staff, who are smiling and provide a
good service for clients, were seen as strong motivating
factors. However, the same recognition was not felt from
the side of the head office, who were reported to seldom
directly interact with CBMs. The head office staff was
not aware that their attention to and interactions with
CBMs were a motivational factor for CBMs.
Generally, the communities seemed to trust the CBMs
and treated them with respect, which was positively in-
fluencing motivation: “They [the community] have posi-
tive reactions, because the kind of the service we offer is
good enough for them to want to come back. And be-
sides coming back [to the clinic], they also advertise
about us.” However, in one clinic, the CBMs reported
that some community members ridiculed them by
claiming they were prostitutes, which seemed related to
their task of promoting contraception, including con-
doms. CBMs also reported that there were misconcep-
tions about the health services promoted, for example
contraceptive pills were sometimes believed to affect the
female’s sexual libido and cervical cancer screening was
sometimes seen as an interference with a woman’s priv-
acy. The misconceptions of communities were not ne-
cessarily reported to be demotivating, rather making the
work as a CBM challenging and worthwhile.
Most CBMs could not exactly define what they under-
stood by supervision beyond the monthly meetings that
they had with their supervisor. In most cases, they




Main reported motivation factors
Intrinsic motivational factors Passion to share information (+)
Wish to help people (+)
Extrinsic motivational factors
Financial Posho [allowance] (+/−)
Non-financial Recognition from clinic management (+)
Recognition from head office (−)




Trainings, seminars, meetings (+/−)
Personal development, gained
knowledge (+)
In-kind Tea, soda (+)
Uniform in the form of blue T-shirts
(+/−)
Working materials - brochures, condoms
(+/−)
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looked at supervision as a welcome idea that could mo-
tivate them: “There is no problem with being super-
vised… it is better because if I am asked a technical
question, it will be easier to get an answer from the
supervisor.” Supervision was also believed to lead to
community trust: “Because it helps to show that we be-
long to MST and the community trusts us in addition to
responding to questions we are not able to answer.” Per-
formance appraisal was not brought up by CBMs, while
supervisors mentioned that when they occasionally ac-
companied CBMs in monthly awareness-raising activ-
ities (vikundi visits), they filled a checklist and provided
feedback on performance.
CBMs reported to value their initial training, but
the orientation at the clinic that followed was found
to be too short, and they said they needed more re-
fresher trainings. “Maybe, the training can be done
once after every three months. We can sit in a room
where we are taught by the nurse about family plan-
ning, so that when a client asks we are able to an-
swer.” There was a general appreciation of the (one-
time) regional training that brought CBMs from dif-
ferent regions together. Technical knowledge shared
at the regional training offered social prestige, self-
satisfaction and gained the CBMs respect in the com-
munity. Besides technical knowledge from trainings,
some CBMs also referred to personal knowledge
gained by being a CBM. “I meet other people”, “I
build my confidence”, “I can speak publicly”, and “I
gain additional knowledge from the trainings” were
common statements portraying non-financial motivat-
ing factors. CBMs did not refer to trainings being fi-
nancial incentives as well, although for some trainings
they did receive transport allowance and per diems.
Career perspectives were not brought up by CBMs as
well as their supervisors.
In-kind incentives
CBMs reported that they occasionally received tea and
soda in the clinic, which served as a motivational factor.
It was common across all FGDs for CBMs to ask for
(blue) T-shirts for better identity and bags. “What I will
request is that a uniform needs to be considered… The
white T-shirt is only one but you cannot wear the white
[or the same] T-shirt the whole week.” Some CBMs
mentioned the importance of identity cards. CBMs fur-
thermore stressed the importance of having brochures
and condoms for distribution, which was echoed by a
supervisor: “Maybe working tools like bags with MST
logo, or bracelet because there are times they go for
community mobilization and you find that people are
not listening; but when you have some promotion mate-
rials the outcome can be much better.”
Towards an adjusted incentive scheme—CBMs’ incentive
preferences
Following the contributions of CBMs, their supervisors
and MST staff, the most suggested areas related to im-
proving CBM motivation were related to remuneration,
training, supervision, benefits and identification. During
the refection workshop, these five attributes and the for-
mulation of two (feasible) levels per attribute were dis-
cussed, and Table 2 shows the final DCE attributes and
levels used in the DCE questionnaire (Additional file 1).
It should be noted that timeliness of payment and ap-
propriate pre-service training were agreed upon as
mandatory management structures that need to be in
place and therefore they were not presented in the DCE.
A total of 61 CBMs filled the DCE questionnaire, in-
cluding the CBMs who participated in the pre-test. All
CBMs had at least primary education and the majority
had secondary education level. Of the 61 CBMs who
filled the questionnaire, 72.1% were female and 27.9%
were male. The average age was 29.5 years. Of the 73.8%
(n = 45) CBMs who provided their years of service, the
average was 2 years and 2 months, with the shortest
years of services being 1 month and the longest 9 years.
The results of the data analysis (Table 3) show that the
means of identification and the training package which is
offered to CBMs affected the choice of preference most
strongly. The univariate models show that an incentive
Table 2 Attributes and levels used in the DCE
Attribute Remuneration Training Supervision Benefits Identification
Level 1 60 000 TSh/month CBMs to attend a
seminar at the
clinic on a specific
health topic every
2 months.
Monthly progress review meetings
including receiving monthly
progress report + clinic manager
or clinic administrative assistant
accompany all monthly
awareness-raising activities and
give immediate feedback to CBMs.
Once every 6 months, the best
performing CBM at your clinic gets







Level 2 50 000 TSh/month
+ 10 000 TSh extra
for every 5 clients
referred by the CBM
group.
CBMs to attend a
seminar at the
clinic on a specific
health topic every
6 months.
Monthly progress review meetings
+ MST head-office visits CBMs in
the field every 6 months and a
group picture is taken.
Once every 6 months, the best
performing group of CBMs in
Tanzania gets a health insurance
covering Marie Stopes services of




Marie Stopes bag +
ID card once.
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scheme including two T-shirts, a bag and an identity card
was preferred over a package with two T-shirts and a bag
alone (OR [95%CI] = 1.64[1.28–2.09]). In addition, respon-
dents showed a clear preference for schemes which in-
clude capacity building seminars at least once every
2 months (OR [95%CI] = 0.42[0.33–0.54]). With regard to
remuneration, CBMs preferred the “flat” amount of
60 000 TSh (26 USD) per month above the flat amount of
50 000 TSh (21.50 USD) plus a “pay for performance”
component (OR [95%CI] = 0.62[0.49–0.79]). As for super-
vision, monthly progress review meetings at the clinic
level combined with the head office visiting CBMs in the
field every 6 months was preferred over more intensified
supervision solely at the clinic level (OR [95%CI] =
1.34[1.05–1.71]). Finally, respondents indicated to have a
small (not significant) preference for those schemes which
include that once every 6 months, the best performing
CBM at each clinic gets the opportunity to visit another
clinic, as compared to the best performing group of CBMs
getting the benefit of a health insurance (OR [95%CI] =
0.91[0.72–1.16]). These results are consistent when a
multivariate model including all attributes was fitted to
the data (Likelihood ratio test = 87.65, p < 0.0001). As the
questionnaire was designed to optimize the efficiency of
estimation of the main attribute effects, no apparent inter-
actions were found. In addition, no differences in out-
comes were observed by respondents’ characteristics.
Discussion
This study provides evidence on preferred incentive op-
tions of CBMs working for MST. This evidence will be
used to pilot and evaluate different incentive schemes at
a later stage, with a focus on motivation and perform-
ance indicators. While providing direction to future in-
centive schemes of MST, the findings might be useful
for programmes including voluntary CHWs with similar
tasks in other settings.
As found in other studies [23, 24], the voluntary CBMs
in this study preferred a combination of financial and
non-financial incentives, where non-financial incentives,
particularly identification—a “hardware element” that
was found to strongly influence “software elements” such
as community trust and recognition [25], training and
supervision were preferred above financial incentives.
The recently published World Health Organization
(WHO) guideline on health policy and system support
to optimize CHW programmes also recommends a mix
of different types of incentives [14, 26]. Despite a low
certainty of evidence, the WHO strongly recommends
remuneration of practising CHWs for their work “with a
financial package commensurate with the job demands,
complexity, number of hours, training and roles that
they undertake” (14, p., 47). This recommendation was
partly made in the light of the international agenda on de-
cent work, sustainable development goal 8, and equity
considerations, as CHWs are often female. At the same
time, the WHO recognizes that volunteers who spend
limited time on the job and have other sources of income
will continue to play a role in health systems [14]. Volun-
teers are often driven by intrinsic motivational factors,
such as religious or moral duty and altruistic concerns for
others and extrinsic, non-financial incentives such as com-
munity respect and recognition of professional health
workers [27–29]. However, there can be ambivalence in
motivation: when (changed) circumstances make volun-
teers uncertain in achieving food security, or when an im-
proved socio-economic status is experienced for
themselves and their families, volunteers may start to re-
quest remuneration [30]. This shows the necessity for pol-
icy makers and programme managers to assess incentive
preferences over time. In addition, this study shows that
clarity about the voluntary nature of the CHW work, in-
cluding about the types of incentives offered, is important
to maintain community trust and respect.
Table 3 Conditional logistic regression results: CBMs’ incentive preferences in Tanzania, December 2017
Attribute Level Univariate model Multivariate model
OR LCI UCI p OR LCI UCI p
Remuneration 60 K 1 – – – – – – –
50 K + 10 K bonus 0.62 0.49 0.79 0.000 13 0.6 0.46 0.77 0.000 076
Training Seminar 2 months 1 – – – – – – –
Seminar 6 months 0.42 0.33 0.54 5.6E−12 0.4 0.31 0.52 2.5E−12
Supervision Monthly + immediate feedback 1 – – – – – – –
Monthly + 6 months MST visit 1.34 1.05 1.71 0.019 1.37 1.06 1.77 0.016
Benefits Best CBM visit other clinic 1 – – – – – – –
Best CBM health insurance 0.91 0.72 1.16 0.46 0.92 0.71 1.19 0.54
Identification Two shirts + bag 1 – – – – – – –
Two shirts + bag + ID card 1.64 1.28 2.09 0.000 076 1.71 1.32 2.21 0.000 039
OR odds ratio, LCI/UCI lower and upper 95% confidence interval respectively, p = value of model coefficient, bold results are significant (p < 0.05)
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The importance of non-financial incentives, such as
(refresher) training and supportive supervision, is also
stressed by the WHO guideline [14, 31]. While—accord-
ing to the definition of incentives used in this paper—
these programme elements influence CHW motivation
and volunteerism, they can be seen as “job enablers” in-
stead of incentives, as essentially they constitute the
basic enabling environment that CHW programmes
should provide for CHWs to be able to execute their
tasks [32]. Identification in the form of an ID card can
motivate CHWs to perform better because it increases
recognition from the community [25], but in the case of
CBMs in Tanzania, it could be argued that it also pro-
vides safety in areas where misconceptions about the
role or messages of CBMs are prevalent in some areas.
The non-financial incentive of career perspective was
not brought up during FGDs with CBMs, contrary to
findings from other studies [4]. This could indicate that
CBMs, their supervisors and managers regarded the
programme as truly voluntary, where the limited time
investment of CBMs did not trigger the wish for future
career advancement.
This study found that CBMs did not prefer a pay-for-
performance option over a flat rate payment scheme.
This could be because systems of performance appraisal
were found to be weak, and performance was currently
measured only in the number of referrals made, possibly
ignoring other important elements of the work of a
CBM [23, 33]. It could also be that despite a recommen-
dation for a pay-for-performance option was made by a
few CBMs in the first phase of this study, some CBMs
did not understand the pay-for-performance option, be-
cause they did not have experience with the concept. Al-
though a few studies have shown that performance-
based incentives for CHWs could improve case finding
for tuberculosis [34, 35], other studies found that non-
incentivized tasks got neglected [23] and one study ar-
gues that performance-based incentives do not provide
voluntary CHWs enough financial security and impede
CHWs’ rights [36]. Therefore, the preference of the “flat
amount” could also be related to the value of having fi-
nancial security. The new WHO guideline makes a con-
ditional suggestion not to pay CHWs exclusively or
predominantly according to performance-based incen-
tives (14, p., 47). It should be noted that the benefits at-
tribute in the DCE in this study consisted of rewarded
benefits for best performing individual CBMs or groups
of CBMs. As such, they could be seen as non-financial
or in-kind incentives based on performance. However,
the study did not find a significant preference for these
kinds of incentives.
DCEs have been used in health systems research, for
example to elicit employment preferences of professional
health workers [37, 38]. One study already found that
DCEs can also be used for voluntary CHWs [16]. While
a key limitation of DCEs is that presented attributes are
hypothetical, the DCE was designed to include feasible,
future options for CBMs’ incentives. Our DCE was con-
ducted among a specific and relatively homogenous
group of CBMs. Findings are not generalizable, but
could provide insights about incentive preferences of
voluntary CHWs with similar tasks in other settings.
The study does not provide insight into the preferred
amount of (flat) payment. As the sample size was small,
no differences in outcomes were observed by for ex-
ample sex or clinic location. To increase the validity of
our research findings, the included attributes and their
levels were based on a small-scale qualitative study
(phase 1) to gain insight into CBMs’, their supervisors’
and manager/decision makers’ experiences and opinions
[20, 21]. We decided to include (only) five attributes, to
ensure that CBMs were able to consider all attributes
listed while making their choice [39]. For each of the at-
tributes, we used a combination of increments and mu-
tually exclusive options (levels 1 and 2). There could
have been misinterpretations among the CBMs about at-
tributes and their levels, but the pre-test showed that the
CBMs were able to fill the DCE and made reasoned and
deliberate choices, even in the absence of probing. We
also limited the number of assignments to eight to avoid
CBMs becoming overwhelmed. This may have affected
our ability to detect true underlying preferences [16].
During data collection, we did not use multiple versions
of the questionnaire, and therefore, positional bias in
responding to the choice sets could have occurred. In
seven of the 11 clinics, the DCE was introduced by MST
head office staff. Although this staff did not have direct
relations with CBMs, it could be that CBMs were influ-
enced by their presence while filling the questionnaire.
Despite this, the outcomes of the DCE, showing the im-
portance of non-financial incentives, do correspond with
the qualitative component of the study.
Conclusion
Despite the recognition that being a CBM is voluntary,
incentives, especially those of non-financial nature, are
important motivators and can potentially improve CBM
performance. Incentive schemes for voluntary CBMs
should include basic financial compensation with a mix
of other incentives, including identification, regular re-
fresher trainings and supportive supervision from the
clinic and head office level.
Voices of CHWs should be heard to optimize CHW
programme designs, improve CHW motivation and per-
formance and prevent CHW attrition. This study shows
that voluntary CHWs are well able to indicate their in-
centive preferences via a DCE. Continuous attention is
Kok et al. Human Resources for Health          (2019) 17:101 Page 7 of 9
needed to ensure incentives are in line with CHWs’ roles
and tasks and broader socio-economic context.
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